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FDA DISCLOSURE OF SAFETY AND EFFICACY DATA: THE
SCOPE OF SECTION 301(j)
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (Act)' requires
a drug manufacturer to submit safety and efficacy data on new drugs2
to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) before the
drug can be introduced into interstate commerce2 Consumer groups4
and drug manufacturers 5 attempt to acquire this data by requesting it
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).6 Their reasons for
requesting the data vary. Drug manufacturers seek to gain a competi-
tive advantage from access to a competitor's safety and efficacy data,
while practitioners and consumer groups wish to verify independently
the drug's safety and effectiveness. Indeed, commentators and the
FDA itself suggest that disclosure of safety and efficacy data would
make the Agency more accessible to the public, thereby promoting
public confidence in the drug approval process. 7
1. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92
(1982)).
2. A "new drug" is defined as a drug whose composition is not generally
recognized "as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the labeling," or a drug whose composition has been so
recognized as a result of investigations, but which has not "been used to a material
extent or for a material time." 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). See infra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
3. The Act provides that no person shall introduce into interstate commerce any
new drug without premarket approval from the Secretary of Health and Human
Services certifying that the drug is safe and effective for use. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b)
(1982). All delegable functions vested in the Secretary by the Act have been delegated
to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1) (1983).
4. See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 1320,
1324 (D.D.C. 1982) (seeking disclosure of safety and efficacy data on medical de-
vices), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Johnson v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 462 F. Supp. 336, 336
(D.D.C. 1978) (seeking disclosure of raw animal test data); cf. Webb v. United States
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (private
practitioner requesting data).
5. The FDA estimates that over 80 % of its FOIA requests originate from business.
Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1977)
(statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA) [hereinafter cited as Business
Record Hearings]; Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1977) (statement of Sherwin Gardner, Deputy Comm'r, FDA) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FOIA Hearings].
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
7. See Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, U. S. Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, Final Report 33-34 (1977) (open decision-making process will increase
public confidence; current policy prevents public access to decision-making process)
[hereinafter cited as Final Report]. One of the major purposes of the FOIA is to
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While the FOIA requires mandatory disclosure of most records
requested by the public,8 nine specific categories of records are exempt
from these mandatory disclosure provisions.9 One of these categories,
the trade secret exemption, exempts from disclosure "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential."' 0 In FOIA litigation, safety and efficacy
data submitted to the FDA generally have been examined under the
Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret which places great
emphasis on the competitive advantage to be derived from specific
information." Because safety and efficacy data often have great com-
educate the public and enhance public confidence in government. See Koch &
Rubin, A Proposal For A Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information
System, 1979 Duke L.J. 1, 30-31 (1979); McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret
Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure
Policies, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 844 (1980); Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety and
Effectiveness Data: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 1979 Duke L.J. 286, 318 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FDA Disclosure].
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1982). The FOIA requires that the request reasonably
describe the record and be made in accordance with published rules and procedures.
Id.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). Because of the FOIA's emphasis on disclosure these
exemptions are to be narrowly construed and the burden of proof is on the agency
opposing disclosure. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630-31 (1982); see Ryan v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington
Research Project, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d
238, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982).
11. Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). The Restatement provides, in
part, that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Id. This
definition has been used to determine the scope of "trade secret" in the FOIA's trade
secret exemption in all but one case examining the scope of "trade secret" in the trade
secret exemption. See Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976)
(natural gas reserves held to be a trade secret under Restatement definition); Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.D.C. 1982)
(applying Restatement definition to safety and efficacy data submitted to the FDA),
afj'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Waelde v.
Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28-29 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (drug company had
not shown all NDA data trade secret under the Restatement definition, not entitled
to protective order); St. Paul's Benev. Educ. & Missionary Inst. v. United States, 506
F. Supp. 822, 830-31 app. (N.D. Ga. 1980) (applying Restatement definition to
computer tape data); Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338, 343 (D.D.C.
1979) (applying Restatement definition to deposition of executive); Ashland Oil, Inc.
v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C.) (applying Restatement definition to natural
gas reserve estimates), aff'd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). But see
Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding Restatement definition inappropriately applied to trade secret exemp-
tion).
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petitive significance, the FDA believes such data to be exempt from
mandatory disclosure under the FOIA as a trade secret.1
2
Although information may be exempt from the FOIA's mandatory
disclosure provisions, it may nonetheless be released at the discretion
of the record-holding agency.' 3 The Trade Secrets Act (TSA), ho-
wever, prevents discretionary disclosure of trade secrets by the FDA to
the extent not authorized by law.' 4 Because properly-promulgated
substantive FDA regulations have the force and effect of law,' s discre-
tionary disclosure pursuant to such a regulation would not violate the
TSA. 16 Section 301(j) of the Act,17 however, prohibits the FDA from
12. See Business Record Hearings, supra note 5, at 70 (statement of Dr. Donald
Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA) ("We have interpreted, since, 1938, the term 'method [or]
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection' under section 301(j) of our
law as encompassing animal and human testing data." (quoting section 301(j) of the
Act)); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 862 & n.127 (citing cases holding safety
and efficacy data to be trade secret); Final Report, supra note 7, at 33 (safety and
efficacy data exempt from disclosure as trade secrets). In adopting the Restatement
definition, the FDA stated in response to comments:
The Commissioner concludes ... that the Restatement definition of a trade
secret should remain the basic guideline for application of [the trade secret
exemption] from the Freedom of Information Act .... The Commissioner
can find no reason why it should be utilized for determining commercial
damages but not for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act.
39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612 (1974) (citation omitted).
13. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 294 (1979); Mead Data Central, Inc.
v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Florida
Medical Ass'n v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1301
(M.D. Fla. 1979); Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C.
1979). This discretionary disclosure is subject to judicial review under § 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that the agency's decision to disclose
may be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). The Trade Secrets Act provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof, . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any informa-
tion coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties...
which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, opera-
tions, style of work ... of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or
association ... shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.
Id.
15. See National Assoc. of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879 (2d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d
Cir. 1977); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Califano, 555 F.2d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (per curiam); National Nutritional Foods Assoc. v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688,
697 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 7:8, at 42 (2d ed. 1979).
16. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979); St. Mary's Hosp.,
Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1979); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith,
545 F. Supp. 421, 424 (D. Md. 1982); Westchester Gen. Hosp. v. United States Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 464 F. Supp. 236, 251 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982).
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releasing information to the public "concerning any method or process
which as a trade secret is entitled to protection."'8 Although disclosure
of safety and efficacy data may serve the public interest, the Agency
believes that section 301(j) prevents it from issuing a substantive regu-
lation providing for discretionary disclosure of safety and efficacy
data. 19 Accordingly, "authorization by law" as required by the Trade
Secrets Act for disclosure of such information is lacking.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, re-
cently refused to apply the Restatement definition of trade secret to
safety and efficacy data in the context of a FOIA request. In Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,20 the court held that a nar-
row, production-oriented definition of trade secret should be applied
to the FOIA's trade secret exemption.2 l Applying this definition to the
safety and efficacy data at issue, the court held the data not exempt
from disclosure as trade secrets. 22
After reviewing both mandatory and discretionary disclosure of
information under the FOIA, this Note argues that the narrow Citizen
Health Research definition of trade secret should be applied to the
term as used in section 301(j) of the Act. The Note concludes that as a
result the FDA is "authorized by law" to issue regulations that permit
discretionary disclosure of safety and efficacy data.23 In addition,
several factors are proposed as guidelines for the FDA in exercising its
discretion to release information pursuant to such regulations.
18. Id.
19. The FDA's position is that § 3010)'s prohibition against disclosure of a
"method [or] process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection" encompasses
safety and efficacy data. See Business Record Hearings, supra note 5, at 70 (testimony
of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA); FOIA Hearings, supra note 5, at 6 (state-
ment of Sherwin Gardner, Deputy Comm'r, FDA). In response to comments on
proposed public information regulations, the FDA stated that there was no difference
in scope between the Trade Secrets Act and § 301(j). "This [has] the effect of
prohibiting any discretionary release of documents that fall within the trade secrets.
. . exemption to the Freedom of Information Act." 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,612
(1974).
20. 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 1288.
22. Id. at 1290.
23. The issue whether discretionary disclosure of safety and efficacy data consti-
tutes a "taking" under the fifth amendment is beyond the scope of this Note. The
issue has arisen in the context of EPA disclosure of data concerning pesticides.
Compare Mobay Chem. Corp. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir.) (disclosure of
safety and efficacy data by EPA held constitutional), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 343
(1982) and Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104, 114 (3d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981) and Petrolite Corp. v. United States EPA, 519 F. Supp.
966, 974 (D.D.C. 1981) (same) with Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm'r United States
EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (disclosure of safety and efficacy data
by EPA held unconstitutional), argued Feb. 27, 1984, 52 U.S.L.W. 3649 (U.S. Mar.
6, 1984) (No. 83-196).
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I. DISCLOSURE OF SAFETY AND EFFICACY DATA UNDER THE FOIA
A. Mandatory Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires new-drug
manufacturers to submit to the FDA a New Drug Application
(NDA),24 containing the results of preclinical and clinical studies of
the new drug's safety and effectiveness, as well as detailed descriptions
of the drug's chemistry, composition and methods of manufacture. 25
This information is evaluated by the FDA as the basis for its decision
whether to approve the drug's introduction into interstate com-
merce.
26
The policy underlying the FOIA supports the disclosure of this
safety and efficacy data. Congress' primary purpose in enacting the
FOIA was to encourage openness in agency decision-making proc-
esses, thereby permitting public evaluation of how an agency is carry-
ing out its statutory duties.27 Disclosure of safety and efficacy data
would allow the public to determine if the FDA is fulfilling its duty to
protect the public from harmful or ineffective drugs.28
24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982).
25. Id. Prior to the submission of an NDA, a new-drug sponsor must obtain the
approval of the FDA to test the safety and efficacy of new drugs. See id. § 355(i); 21
C.F.R. § 312.1 (1983); Final Report, supra note 7, at 19-20. The applicant must
submit a Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug (IND), which
discloses the chemical name, a list of chemical components, a statement of quantita-
tive composition, and the methods of manufacturing, processing, and packing of the
new drug, in addition to any data already developed concerning the drug's safety and
effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a)(2) (1983). Approval of the IND allows the sponsor
to ship the drug in interstate commerce in order to conduct clinical testing. See id. §
312.1(a). The NDA consists of the results of the clinical testing and the IND. See id. §
314. 1(b).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1982); Final Report, supra note 7, at 24-25.
27. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source
Book 27 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as Source Book] and in 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2423; S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965),
reprinted in Source Book, supra, at 38; see United States Dep't of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
152-53 (1975); Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
28. See FOIA Hearings, supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Sherwin Gardner,
Deputy Comm'r, FDA); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 843-44; FDA Disclo-
sure, supra note 7, at 318. The purpose of the Act was to protect the consumer. See
Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S.
689, 696 (1948); United States v. Naremco, Inc., 553 F.2d 1138, 1141 (8th Cir.
1977); United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am., 457 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Four Devices, 176 F.2d 652, 654 (10th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Two Bags, 147 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1945). The Act requires submission of safety
data in order to "prevent the premature marketing of new drugs not properly tested
for safety." H.R. Rep. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1938), reprinted in 6 FDA,
A Legislative History of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and Its Amend-
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In addition, factors peculiar to the FDA's responsibilities support
disclosure. In deciding whether a new drug is safe and effective, the
FDA must rely on the voluminous data submitted by the drug manu-
facturer.29 It has been suggested that disclosure of NDA data would
allow for more thorough review of the safety and efficacy data sub-
mitted by drug manufacturers.3 0 Scientists and others would be able
to evaluate independently the data submitted by manufacturers and
provide further assurance that such data accurately reflect a drug's
safety and effectiveness .3 Additionally, such disclosure would mini-
mize the waste of resources that occurs when tests on new drugs are
duplicated by other new-drug manufacturers.32
Congress exempted trade secret and confidential commercial infor-
mation from disclosure under the FOIA to protect against harm re-
sulting from agency disclosure of valuable business information. 33
This exemption permits an agency to withhold "trade secrets and
ments at 300, 308 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]. The Act was
amended in 1962 to require submission of efficacy data in order to assist the FDA in
providing "a safer and more reliable drug supply for the Nation by requiring. . . a
premarketing showing that all new drugs are effective-as well as safe-for their
intended uses." S. Rep. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962), reprinted in 22
Legislative History, supra, at 94, 101.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982) (FDA requires submission of NDA by new-
drug manufacturer). Data submitted in support of a NDA may total several hundred
volumes. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 24. In addition, such data may not be
totally reliable. The FDA has recognized that adverse data may be minimized and
favorable data emphasized. In an effort to minimize manufacturer bias the FDA
usually examines the raw safety and efficacy data developed by drug manufacturers.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 82,052, 82,053 (1980).
30. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 34; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at
843.
31. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 34 (Current policy prevents scientists and
the public from "examining and commenting on the facts which underlie agency
decisions."); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 843 (Public disclosure would
provide assistance in assessing data and improve the quality of agency decisions.);
FDA Disclosure, supra note 7, at 317-18 (Public disclosure would insure public
participation in the FDA decision-making process.).
32. See Final Report, supra note 7, at 35; McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at
845-46.
33. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). The trade secret and confidential commer-
cial information exemption of the FOIA was considered "necessary to protect the
confidentiality of information which is obtained by the Government ... but which
would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was
obtained. This would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, and
manufacturing processes." S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), reprinted
in Source Book, supra note 27, at 44; see Shermco Indus. Inc. v. Secretary of Air
Force, 613 F.2d 1314, 1317 (5th Cir. 1980); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Audio Technical Servs. Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Army, 487 F. Supp. 779, 781 (D.D.C. 1979); Clement, The Rights of
Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The
Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 587, 593-94 (1977).
12851984]
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commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential."' 34 The courts, in interpreting this exemp-
tion, rely on the definition of trade secret provided by section 757 of
the Restatement of Torts. 35 This definition focuses on competitive
advantage, providing that a trade secret may consist of a "compilation
of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over his competitors who do not
know or use it."36 Under the Restatement definition, safety and effi-
cacy data have been considered trade secrets by both the courts and
the FDA. 37
Safety and efficacy data submitted to the FDA provide a competi-
tive advantage to the submitter. Accumulation of such data is costly, 38
however, and is often formulated at the expense of other research and
development that a drug company might have conducted. Competi-
tors must compile their own safety and efficacy data if they wish to
submit an NDA for the same drug.39 If the submitter's safety and
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). The majority of litigation over the scope of this
exemption concerns the second prong, which exempts confidential commercial infor-
mation from disclosure under the FOIA. See United States Dep't of Justice, Freedom
of Information Case List 213 (1983 ed.); O'Reilly, Government Disclosure of Private
Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, 30 Bus. Law. 1125, 1126 (1975);
FDA Disclosure, supra note 7, at 297. One commentator has noted that in "practi-
cally none of the reported reverse FOIA cases (or direct FOIA cases) have the courts
treated the disputed material as trade secrets." Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens:
A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981
Wis. L. Rev. 207, 267. The confidential commercial information prong applies to
data if its disclosure would be likely: "(1) to impair the Government's ability to
obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained."
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(footnote omitted).
35. E.g., Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976); Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983); St. Paul's
Benevolent Educ. & Missionary Inst. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 822, 830 (N.D.
Ga. 1980); see J. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 14.06, at 14-14 (1977);
Connelly, supra note 34, at 230; O'Reilly, supra note 34, at 1126; FDA Disclosure,
supra note 7, at 297-99.
36. Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939).
37. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44,601, 44,634 (1974) (FDA estimates cost of developing
safety and efficacy data as "hundreds of thousands, and in some instances, millions of
dollars"); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 849 (average cost of testing estimated
in 1980 to be between 2.7 and 4.7 million dollars).
39. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 849; Final Report, supra note 7, at
33. FDA regulations provide that data in FDA files may be incorporated by reference
into an NDA "furnished by a person other than the applicant [only if] use of such
information is authorized ... by the person who submitted it." 21 C.F.R. § 314. l(b)
(1983).
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efficacy data were disclosed to a competitor, the competitor could
incorporate the data into its own NDA. Disclosure would allow a
competitor to determine the feasibility of developing similar drugs
without the research and development costs incurred by the first
manufacturer. A competitor might also incorporate the same data
into an application in a foreign country for the manufacture and sale
of the drug.
The FOIA, however, does not prohibit agencies from disclosing
records that may be withheld pursuant to one of the FOIA's exemp-
tions. 40 Thus, the FDA may decide to disclose safety and efficacy data
even if the data are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA as a trade
secret. Discretionary disclosure of exempt material, however, is sub-
ject to statutory restrictions.
B. Discretionary Disclosure of Exemption Four Trade Secret Data
When an agency attempts to release to the public data that the
submitter considers to be a trade secret, the submitter may seek to
enjoin disclosure. 41 This reverse-FOIA suit is brought under section
10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),42 which provides for
40. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
41. E.g., Penzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1976); Cohtinental Oil
Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976);
Brookwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (N.D. Ga.
1979), aJf'd mem., 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980); Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger,
403 F. Supp. 633, 634 (E.D. Va. 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger,
392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974), aJ'd, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504, 506 (W.D.
Ky. 1974). The first such suit was Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F.
Supp. 212, 213 (D.D.C. 1973), remanded, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see
Clement, supra note 33, at 589-90. FDA regulations provide for notification to the
submitter of data when the confidentiality of the data is uncertain. 21 C.F.R. § 20.45
(1983). If the Agency decides to release the data, the submitter has five days after
notification to institute suit seeking to enjoin disclosure of the data. Id. § 20.46. As
Professor Clement notes, most reverse-FOIA suits are brought by the submitter of the
data upon receiving notification of pending disclosure, prior to actual release to the
requester. Clement, supra note 33, at 590 n.8.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). Prior to Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979), reverse-FOIA suits were brought under three legal theories. Under the first,
submitters contended that the FOIA prohibited agencies from disclosing data that
fell into any of the FOIA's exemptions and thus the FOIA provided an implied cause
of action. E.g., Brookwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247,
1248 (N.D. Ga. 1979), ajff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Brown, 443 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D. Va. 1977); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1190
(4th. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977). Second, submitters argued that a
cause of action existed to prevent disclosure of trade secret data under the Trade
Secrets Act. E.g., Brookwood Medical Center, Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1249; Brown,
443 F. Supp. at 1228; Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. at 1248. Finally, submitters claimed
that the APA provided for review of an agency's decision to disclose material that was
19841 1287
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judicial review of agency action. 43 A reverse-FOIA suit will prevent
disclosure of trade secrets if the decision to disclose was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. ' 44 Under section 10(e) of the APA, the Federal Trade
Secrets Act may bar disclosure of safety and efficacy data as being
"not in accordance with law."45
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,46 the Supreme Court dealt with a
challenge under the APA to discretionary disclosure of data pursuant
to agency regulations. 47 The Court recognized that, "properly
promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the 'force and ef-
fect of law,' ",48 and thus could provide the authorization to disclose
data that otherwise would be prohibited by the TSA.49 The Court
either exempt from the FOIA or within the ambit of the Trade Secrets Act. E.g.,
General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 919 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d
1172, 1190-92 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). The Supreme Court in Chrysler held that only the APA
provided judicial review of an agency's decision to disclose data exempt from the
FOIA, thereby limiting reverse-FOIA suits to the third theory. See Chrysler Corp.,
441 U.S. at 294, 316, 318.
43. The APA provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). See Megapulse,
Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Humana of Va., Inc. v. Blue
Cross, 622 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1980); J. H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp.
421, 423 (D. Md. 1982).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 83 (N.D.
Ind. 1982); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. SEC, 548 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1982); St.
Joseph's Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 489 F. Supp. 1052, 1062 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614
F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); English, Protecting the Stakeholder: Defense of the Gov-
ernment Agency's Interests During Reverse FOIA Lawsuits, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 151, 169
(1979).
45. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979); Humana of Va., Inc.
v. Blue Cross, 622 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1980); Green v. IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 83
(N.D. Ind. 1982); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. SEC, 548 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C.
1982); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
46. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
47. Id. at 287. In Chrysler, the plaintiff was seeking to block the disclosure of
employment data submitted to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Pursuant to
Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, the Secretary of Labor required government
contractors to submit data concerning affirmative-action programs. Id. at 286. The
Secretary had also promulgated regulations providing for the public disclosure of
such records when in the public interest. Id. at 287. After Chrysler submitted the
data, a FOIA request was received by the DLA and Chrysler was notified that the
data was to be released pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
Chrysler brought suit to block disclosure of the data. Id. at 287-88.
48. Id. at 295.
49. See id. at 315-16; Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719, 722-24
(6th Cir. 1980); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Harris, 604 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1979);
J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp. 421, 424 (D. Md. 1982); 2 B. Mezines, J.
Stein & J. Gruff, Administrative Law § 10A.04[3], at 1OA-53 (1983).
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held that such a regulation must be "reasonably within the contem-
plation of [the] grant of [rulemaking] authority" given the agency by
Congress.50 In addition, the regulation must affect "individual rights
and obligations"' 1 and be properly promulgated as required by section
4 of the APA.52
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 contains a
general grant of rulemaking authority, empowering the FDA to issue
regulations "necessary for the efficient enforcement" of the Act. 53 This
general grant of rulemaking authority has been held to authorize the
FDA "to promulgate substantive regulations having the binding force
of law."' 54 Section 301(j) of the Act, however, prohibits the FDA from
disclosing a "method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to
protection." 55 This prohibition is applicable to information obtained
from manufacturers that submit safety and efficacy data to the FDA
for drug approval.56
The FDA has applied the Restatement definition of trade secret to
section 301 (j); 7 consequently, FDA regulations implementing section
301(j) prohibit the discretionary disclosure of safety and efficacy
data.58 A statement accompanying the publication of the regulations
50. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 306.
51. Id. at 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
52. The Court noted that "the promulgation of these regulations must conform
with any procedural requirements imposed by Congress," and that these limitations
are those imposed by the APA. Id. at 303. The Court held that regulations authoriz-
ing disclosure must be properly promulgated according to the "notice-and-comment"
rulemaking provisions of § 4 of the APA. Id. at 313.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1982).
54. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 697 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); see National Ass'n. of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v.
FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 879 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods.
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Califano,
555 F.2d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam); 2 K. Davis, supra note 15, § 7:8,
at 42-43 (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 371(a)). To disclose safety and efficacy data, the
FDA must promulgate a regulation which would satisfy the Chrysler tests. As in
Chrysler, an FDA regulation authorizing disclosure of safety and efficacy data would
affect individual rights and obligations. 441 U.S. at 302. If such a regulation were
promulgated in accordance with § 4 of the APA, the regulation would conform to
"any procedural requirements imposed by Congress." Id. at 303. As was the case in
Chrysler, the focus of analysis would then be whether it was "reasonably within the
contemplation" of § 701(a) of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. One commentator
has noted that the FOIA itself empowers agencies to promulgate substantive regula-
tions authorizing the disclosure of exempt data when in the public interest. See
Clement, supra note 33, at 619-20.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982).
56. Id. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
57. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (1983).
58. FDA regulations provide that previously undisclosed safety and efficacy data
will be disclosed only when certain circumstances are shown. These are: "(1) The
NDA has been abandoned ... [or] (2) A final determination is made that the NDA is
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indicates that the FDA considers itself required by law to withhold
such data. 59
Implicit in this analysis of section 301 (j)'s prohibition against disclo-
sure of a "method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to
protection" is the assumption that the Restatement definition was
meant to apply to safety and efficacy data obtained from drug manu-
facturers.6 0 A recent reexamination of the trade secret doctrine by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, together
with an analysis of the legislative history of section 301(j), suggest that
the Restatement definition should not be applied to section 3010).
II. CITIZEN HEALTH REsEABcI's NARmow DEFINITION OF TRADE
SECRET As APPLIED To SECTION 3010)
A. Citizen Health Research-A Narrow Definition of Trade Secret
In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,"' the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the issue whether
records produced during ongoing clinical studies of the safety and
efficacy of intraocular lenses were exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA.62 The Court of Appeals stated that it was "far from clear that
not approvable ... [or] (3) Approval of the NDA is withdrawn ... [or] (4) A final
determination has been made that the drug is not a new drug [or] (5) A final
determination has been made that the drug may be marketed without submission of
such safety and/or effectiveness data and information." 21 C.F.R. § 314.14(f) (1983).
Section 20.82 provides that the Commissioner may, in his discretion, disclose any
data that are otherwise exempt when in the public interest, or when such disclosure
will promote the objectives of the Act or agency, except "any record that is: (1)
Exempt from public disclosure pursuant to § 20.61 .... " Id. § 20.82. Section 20.61
exempts from disclosure any information that is a trade secret as defined by the
Restatement. See id. § 20.61.
59. Responding to comments received concerning the FDA's public information
regulations, the FDA stated: "The Commissioner advises ... that he has no discre-
tion to release trade secret information. All records subject to the trade secret exemp-
tion from the Freedom of Information Act are prohibited from public disclosure
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1905 and 21 U.S.C. 3310) .... Accordingly, [§ 20.82] does
not permit discretionary release of such material." 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,619
(1974).
60. 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602, 44,634 (1974). "Data that no longer provide a competi-
tive advantage-because any competitor may lawfully market the product involved,
or because the information has otherwise been made public, or for other reasons-no
longer qualify as a trade secret under 18 U.S.C. 1905, 21 U.S.C. 331(j), or the
Freedom of Information Act." Id.
61. 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 1283. The records were submitted to the FDA by intraocular lens
manufacturers and were subsequently requested by a public interest group. The FDA
refused to disclose certain requested records, basing its decision on the FOIA's trade
secret exemption and FDA regulations prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets.
Health Research Group brought suit challenging the FDA's application of the trade-
FDA DISCLOSURE
Congress intended [the Restatement definition of trade secret] to gov-
ern in FOIA cases,"'6 3 and held the broad Restatement definition
inapplicable "as inconsistent with the language of the FOIA and its
underlying policies. 64 The court asserted that "the term 'trade secrets'
in Exemption 4 of the FOIA should be defined in its narrower com-
mon law sense, which incorporates a direct relationship between the
information at issue and the productive process."6 5
The Citizen Health Research court defined trade secret, for the
purposes of the exemption, as "a secret, commercially valuable plan,
formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort. '66
The court cited the only pre-FOIA case to define trade secrets under
the TSA, which applied a similar definition.6 7 Applying this restrictive
definition, the court concluded that the safety and efficacy data at
issue were not protected by the exemption's trade secret prong.68 The
court stated that "under no plausible reading of the phrase 'plan,
formula, process or device' could the [data] sought by the [Health
Research Group] be said to fall within its ambit. ' 6 9 The case was
remanded for a determination whether the data was otherwise ex-
6mpt from mandatory disclosure under the commercial information
prong.70
Because release of safety and efficacy data may result in competi-
tive harm, such data may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under
the FOIA's commercial information prong. Nevertheless, the data
may still be disclosed by the FDA unless such disclosure is prevented
by section 301(j). If the Restatement definition is applied to section
301(j)'s prohibition against release of a "method or process" which is a
trade secret, then the FDA is prohibited from discretionary disclosure
of safety and efficacy data. 71 If, however, a narrow production-ori-
secret exemption. See id. The lower court held much of the requested material to be
trade secret, and therefore exempt from disclosure under the exemption. Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 539 F. Supp. 1320, 1328-30 (D.D.C. 1982),
afJ'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
63. Citizen Health Research, 704 F.2d. at 1286.
64. Id. at 1288.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff
Comm., 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), vacated as moot, 274 U.S. 106 (1927).
68. Citizen Health Research, 704 F.2d at 1290.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1292.
71. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text. This is currently the FDA's
position. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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ented approach is taken to section 3010), the FDA may use its discre-
tion to disclose safety and efficacy data.72
B. Narrow Definition of Trade Secret Applied to Section 301(j)
Section 3010) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act pro-
hibits the FDA from disclosing any "method or process which as a
trade secret is entitled to protection." 73 In the absence of a congressio-
nal definition of the terms of this prohibition, it is assumed that
Congress intended their ordinary meanings to apply.74 As the Citizen
Health Research court found, the term 'trade secret' is both broadly
and narrowly defined at common law.7 5 The court opted for a nar-
row, production-oriented definition of trade secret .76 In section 301(j),
however, the scope of the term "trade secret," in addition to being
subject to conflicting interpretations, is limited to any "method or
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection. 7 7 Therefore,
by its terms section 301 (j)'s prohibition is limited to information relat-
ing to the methods or processes of production. 78 This interpretation is
72. Arguably, the only statutory bar to discretionary disclosure of such data by
the FDA is § 3010) of the Act. The Trade Secrets Act will not bar disclosure of data
pursuant to valid substantive regulations. As the Court in Chrysler made clear,
however, such a regulation must be related to the Congressional grant of rulemaking
authority given the agency. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979).
In the area of public information, the only possible limitation of the FDA's authority
is § 3010). If the scope of § 3010) does not encompass safety and efficacy data, there
is no limitation on the FDA's rulemaking authority which could prevent it from
disclosure pursuant to such regulation.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982).
74. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 254 (1980); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); T. L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532,
535 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction. §
46.01, at 48 (4th ed. 1973).
75. Citizen Health Research, 704 F.2d at 1286. The court noted that two defini-
tions were applied in determining the scope of "trade secret," the narrow Norwegian
Nitrogen definition and the broad Restatement definition. See id. Compare Restate-
ment of Torts § 757 comment b (1939) (broad common-law definition) with United
States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d
491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (narrow common-law definition), vacated as moot, 274
U.S. 106 (1927).
76. See Citizen Health Research, 704 F.2d at 1289. The court stated that applica-
tion of the Restatement definition of trade secret, with its emphasis on competitive
advantage, would render the confidential commercial information prong of the
exemption meaningless. Material is exempt from disclosure under the exemption's
second prong if its disclosure is likely to cause substantial competitive harm. Id. See
supra note 34.
77. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982) (emphasis added).
78. A method is "a way of doing anything; mode; procedure; process; . ..
regularity or orderliness in action." Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary
1134 (2d ed. 1983). A process is "a continuing development involving many changes;
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supported by examining the legislative history of the prohibition
against disclosure.
1. History of Section 301(j)'s Prohibition Against Disclosure
The first draft of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, introduced in
the Senate in 1933, 9 had no provision prohibiting disclosure of trade
secrets.80 The proposed Act required drug manufacturers to label all
drugs with the drug's formula and composition by weight.," The bill
also provided for government inspection of factories in order to issue
factory permits and prevent the manufacture of illegal drugs.8 2 Manu-
facturers were not required to submit formulas to the FDA, nor were
there any special requirements for the approval of new drugs.8 3
During hearings on the proposed Act, manufacturers protested that
the labeling requirements would force disclosure of secret formulas
and methods of combining ingredients, and thus would destroy their
... a particular method of doing something, generally involving a number of steps
or operations." Id. at 1434. Safety and efficacy data are not methods or processes as
defined here, because neither is a "mode" or "procedure" or a "method of doing
something." By contrast, a secret type of manufacturing or packaging process or a
newly-invented method of determining the efficiency of a manufacturing process
would be a "method" or "process".
79. See S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in 1 Legislative History,
supra note 28, at 1. The bill's introduction stated that its purpose was "[t]o prevent
the manufacture, shipment, and sale of adulterated or misbranded food, drugs, and
cosmetics, and to regulate traffic therein .... and for other purposes." Id., reprinted
in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 1. The report of a later bill similar to S.
1944 described the Act as a remedy for the inadequacies of the Federal Food and
Drug Act of 1906. See S. Rep. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in 2
Legislative History, supra note 28. at 721.
80. See S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 17 (1933), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 23-25.
81. See id. §§ 6(b), 8(e), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 7,
11.
82. See id. §§ 12, 13, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 16-18.
Section 13 (factory inspection) gave the FDA authority to "enter upon the premises of
manufacturers and dealers where ... [adulterated or misbranded drugs] are being
manufactured or held in storage . . . . Authority to inspect premises is usually
regarded as an indispensable implement for the enforcement of statutes enacted for
the protection of the public health." S. Rep. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17,
reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 737.
83. Provisions regarding submission of data as a condition to marketing new
drugs were not included in the proposed Act until after the Elixir Sulfanilamide
disaster of 1937, in which over 70 people were killed as a result of using a newly-
developed, untested drug. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. Representa-
tive Chapman, who introduced the provision that subsequently became § 505 of the
Act, stated in debate the there was nothing in the pre-Elixir bill that would have
prevented the occurrence of the Elixir incident. See 82 Cong. Rec. 135 (1937);
Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its
Substantive Provisions, 6 Law & Contemp. Probs. 2, 20 (1939).
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property interests. 84 The manufacturers claimed that the benefit ac-
cruing to the public by such labeling did not justify the disclosure of
their formulae.85
Manufacturers also claimed that factory inspections would place
them at a competitive disadvantage. 8 At the hearings, the General
Counsel of the National Confectioners Association stated that an in-
spector's memory may "serve him in good stead .. . [because the]
[p]rocesses with which he has become familiar . . .can be utilized
unfairly in competing with the very manufacturer whom he has in-
spected. It must be remembered that time and money are expended by
progressive manufacturers in establishing plant practices [and] devel-
oping equipment. . . ."
In the next session, Senator Copeland introduced a new bill that
prohibited disclosure of "any method or process which is entitled to
protection in equity as a trade secret" and that was obtained as a
result of factory permit or inspection procedures. 88 The Senate Report
84. See Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1933) (statement of Dr.
John F. Anderson, Vice President, E.R. Squibb & Sons) (disclosure of formula on
labels would damage property rights) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1944],
reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 245; id. at 312 (brief of United
Medicine Mfrs.) (disclosure of ingredients and formulae will harm manufacturers),
reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 403; id. at 453 (brief of Delson
Chem. Co.) (if forced to disclose formulae the manufacturer "may find his products
in competition with cheap imitations" which will cause him competitive harm),
reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 544; id. at 484 (letter of Dec. 15,
1933 from Merrill Hutchinson to Sen. Shipstead) (same), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 575.
85. See Hearings on S. 1944, supra note 84, at 304 (statememt of Norman
Dillingham) ("disclosure of any formula is absolutely unjustified by any possible
benefits accruing to the public"), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at
395; id. at 312 (brief of United Medicine Mfrs.) (disclosure will be to the "ultimate
disadvantage of the purchasing public"), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra
note 28, at 403.
86. See Hearings on S. 1944, supra note 84, at 137 (statement of Sebastian
Mueller, Vice President, H.J. Heinz Co.) (objecting to goverment access to methods
or processes), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 228; id. at 157
(statement of Dr. John F. Anderson, Vice President, E.R. Squibb & Sons) (the
government's right to "inspect all equipment, methods, processes, materials, contain-
ers" not objectionable if access limited to government, but "eventually what is in the
hands of the Government is in the hands of the competitor"), reprinted in 1 Legisla-
tive History, supra note 28, at 248; id. at 299 (statement of John S. Hall) (objecting to
disclosure of "perfected methods and processes"), reprinted in 1 Legislative History,
supra note 28, at 390.
87. Hearings on S. 1944, supra note 84, at 444 (statement of W. Parker Jones,
General Counsel for Nat'l Confectioners' Ass'n), reprinted in 1 Legislative History,
supra note 28, at 535.
88. S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(g) (1934), reprinted in 1 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 787.
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accompanying the bill explained that "[a]s a safeguard to manufactur-
ers, [the disclosure prohibition] would penalize the improper use or
disclosure of any information obtained by Government inspectors...
concerning any secret method or process in use in any plant."' 9
A third bill, substantially identical to the second, was introduced in
1935.90 When the Senate passed this bill, the text of the section prohib-
iting disclosure of trade secrets was identical to the current section
301(j), though it expressly applied only to information obtained
through the Act's factory permit and inspection provisions. 91 When
provisions requiring drug manufacturers to submit safety data to the
FDA were included in the bill, section 301(j) was extended to include
this information.92 It is doubtful, however, that Congress intended to
include all data required from drug manufacturers within the scope of
the prohibition.
2. Inclusion of New Drug Data Within Section 301(j)'s Prohibition
In May of 1938, after the third bill had passed the Senate and was
before the House, provisions were included requiring submission of
data to the FDA before a manufacturer could market a new drug.9 3
The Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster of late 1937 prompted the inclusion
of these requirements.9 4 Over seventy people died during September
and October of 1937 because they used a newly-developed drug that
had never been tested, despite the availability of simple clinical tests. 95
89. S. Rep. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 741. The prohibition as expressed in the Senate Report was
limited to disclosure of information obtained by plant inspection and permit proce-
dures and did not include the term "trade secret." See id. at 17-18, 21, reprinted in 2
Legislative History, supra note 28, at 737-38, 741.
90. S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra
note 28, at 1.
91. S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 708(a)(9) (1935), reprinted in 4 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 216. The section prohibited "[tihe using by any person to
his own advantage ... any information acquired under authority of sections 305
[Emergency Permit Control] or 707 [Factory Inspection] concerning any method or
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection." Id., reprinted in 4 Legisla-
tive History, supra note 28, at 216.
92. See S. 5, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. § 301(j) (1935), reprinted in 3 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 1. The Senate passed S. 5 on March 9, 1937. 81 Cong. Rec.
2019 (1937). As a result of the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster, the House amended S. 5
to include § 505. See Cavers, supra note 83, at 20. There was no debate concerning
the application of § 3010) to information acquired under § 505.
93. Section 505 first appeared in the proposed Act, S. 5, on March 5, 1938, when
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce amended the bill. See S.
5, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 505 (Comm. Print No. 4 1938), reprinted in 6 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 46.
94. See 1 H. Toulmin, A Treatise on the Law of Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics §
1.5, at 13 (2d ed. 1963); Cavers, supra note 83, at 20.
95. See Elixir Sulfanilamide, S. Doc. No. 124, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1937),
reprinted in 5 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 883, 885-87.
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Shortly thereafter bills were introduced in both the Senate and the
House requiring manufacturers to submit data to the FDA to obtain
approval before introducing a new drug.9 6 The House bill subse-
quently became section 505 of the Act.97 Section 505 requires manu-
facturers to submit full reports of investigations showing that the drug
is safe and effective for use, a full list of the articles used as compo-
nents of the drug, a full description of the methods used in the
manufacturing, processing, and packing of the drug, and a full state-
ment of the drug's composition.9 8
The purpose of section 301(j), together with the submission require-
ments of section 505 of the Act, suggests that not all the data required
under section 505 should be included within the scope of "any method
or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection." 99 The drug
industry had two complaints concerning disclosure of safety and effi-
cacy data required under section 505 of the earliest draft of the Act.
These were the proposed labeling requirements, 00 that required dis-
closure of formulae and the composition, and disclosure of methods or
processes used in factories.' 0 1 In response to these industry complaints,
96. See H.R. 9341, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1938), reprinted in 6 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 1; S. 3073, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1-2 (1938), reprinted in 6
Legislative History, supra note 28, at 10.
97. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat.
1040, 1052-53 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982); see 1 H.
Toulmin, supra note 94, § 1.5, at 13; Cavers, supra note 84, at 13. Compare H.R.
9341, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) (House bill requiring submission of safety data on
new drugs), reprinted in 6 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 2 with 21 U.S.C. §
355 (1982) (§ 505 of the Act as codified and amended).
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982). Efficacy data were not required under the Act
of 1938. This requirement was added by Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 103, 104, 76 Stat.
780, 782-85 (1962). In 1962, the House passed a bill which would have required all
data acquired by the FDA to be held confidential. The bill omitted the phrase
"concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection"
from § 3010). See H.R. 11,581, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(2) (1962), reprinted in 22
Legislative History, supra note 28, at 980. The Senate did not agree to the amend-
ment, and the Drug Amendments of 1962 did not omit the phrase from § 3010). See
Drug Amendments of 1962, H.R. Rep. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1962),
reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2927, 2935 and in 23 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 161, 186. In any event, the enlarged scope of the proposed
prohibition was directed towards production data. The House report accompanying
H.R. 11,581 stated: "[I]n view of the broadened factory inspection authority con-
tained in the bill, the ... amendments to section 3010) extend the prohibitions of
this section .... "Drug Amendments of 1962, H.R. Rep. No. 2464, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1962), reprinted in 22 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 984, 998.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982).
100. S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6(b), 8(e), reprinted in 1 Legislative History,
supra note 28, at 7, 11.
101. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Manufacturers may have been
more wary of the factory inspection provision. As Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the
FDA stated at the hearings on S. 1944: "I have had manufacturers of drug products
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subsequent bills did not require such explicit labeling,' 0 2 and prohib-
ited disclosure of secret methods or processes that were obtained
through factory permit or inspection procedures.' 0 3
Section 505 requires drug manufacturers .to submit for FDA ap-
proval formulae, composition, and components used in a new drug, in
addition to a description of the methods used in the drug's manufac-
turing, processing and packing. 0 4 Section 301(j) applies to the meth-
ods of manufacture, processing and packing obtained by virtue of
section 505. It is arguable that section 3010) was also meant to protect
new-drug formulae and composition. 0 5 Although the earlier drafts
subjected formulae to the labeling requirements, 0 6 these requirements
were omitted, in response to industry complaints,' 0 7 by the time the
bill became law.'08 This omission supports the argument for including
formulae and composition within section 3010). It is unlikely that
Congress intended to allow the FDA to disclose such data to the public
when Congress decided against requiring the manufacturer to provide
formula and composition on drug labels.
The safety and efficacy data required by section 505,109 however,
were unlikely to be discovered through factory permit or inspection
tell me repeatedly that there was no objection to [the labeling] requirement; that it
was not the ingredients or the composition of the article which constitute the secret,
but rather the method of combining the various ingredients." Hearings on S. 1944,
supra note 84, at 59, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra 28, at 151.
102. See S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(b) (1935) (requiring quantity disclosure
in package labeling), reprinted in 3 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 13; S. 2800,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b) (1934) (same), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra
note 28, at 765; S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b) (1934) (same), reprinted in 1
Legislative History, supra note 28, at 603.
103. See S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 708(g) (1935), reprinted in 3 Legislative
History, supra note 28, at 33; S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(g) (1934), reprinted
in I Legislative History, supra note 28, at 623; S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(g)
(1934), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 787.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982).
105. In light of the vehement opposition expressed at the hearings on S. 1944 to
the labeling requirements of the bill, the watering down of the provisions in subse-
quent bills must have been in response to the statements made at the hearings. See
supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Disclosure of formulae and composition
would result in at least as much competitive injury as would disclosure of a method
or process of production. In this instance at least, the Restatement definition of trade
secret applied to the scope of § 301(j) would accomplish the result Congress intended.
106. See S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6(b), 8(b) (1934), reprinted in 1 Legisla-
tive History, supra note 28, at 7, 10.
107. After the hearings on S. 1944, the Subcommittee's Statement With Reference
to Revised Bill, S. 2800, stated that the changes retained the earlier aim of consumer
protection "but they remove[d] the causes for apprehension so generally felt by
reputable manufacturers .. " Hearings on S. 1944, supra note 84, at 494, reprinted
in 1 Legislative History, supra note 28, at 585.
108. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1982).
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procedures. Accordingly, Congress could not have intended to protect
this data by section 301(j)'s prohibition against disclosure.
The common-law definition of trade secret adopted by the court in
Citizen Health Research appropriately delimits the scope of section
301(j)'s prohibition against disclosure of a "method or process which
as a trade secret is entitled to protection."1 0 Section 301(j) was in-
tended to protect secret methods or processes used in the manufactur-
ing process, not to prohibit disclosure of data, such as safety and
efficacy data, that are unrelated to the production process."' A nar-
row, production-oriented definition of trade secret would protect data
in the manner intended by Congress and thus should be adopted by
the FDA in interpreting section 301(). This approach would permit
the FDA to issue substantive regulations authorizing disclosure of
safety and efficacy data."12 These regulations would advance the pub-
lic welfare and afford more efficient enforcement of the Act by pro-
viding safer and more effective drugs. " 3 Consequently, such regula-
tions would furnish the authorization by law required by the Trade
Secrets Act. 1 4
These regulations should take into consideration the legitimate
needs of the manufacturer, in addition to the public benefits accruing
from disclosure of safety and efficacy data. To accomplish this, the
regulation should take advantage of the benefits of discretionary dis-
closure, as opposed to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. The
FOIA requires disclosure to any member of the requesting public,
including competitors.l"5 Discretionary disclosure, on the other hand,
would permit the FDA to release information when it determines that
to do so is in the public interest." 6 Several factors may guide the FDA
110. 21 U.S.C. § 3310) (1982).
111. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
112. Under the Restatement definition of trade secret, as applied to § 3010), the
FDA is prohibited by § 301(0) from releasing safety and efficacy data. If § 301(0) is
read so as to not include safety and efficacy data, then the FDA is not prevented from
disclosing safety and efficacy data. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
113. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1982) (providing that the FDA may "promulgate
regulations for the efficient enforcement of [the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]").
Because disclosure of safety and efficacy data would help ensure thorough review of
manufacturer-submitted data, and hence further the Act's purpose of providing safer
and more effective drugs for the public, disclosure of safety and efficacy data is
"reasonably within the contemplation of [the] grant of [rulemaking] authority" given
the the FDA in § 371(a). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 306 (1979).
114. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
115. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b) (1982).
116. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977), the court
held that a grant of authority similar to that given the FDA authorized the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to disclose proprietary material exempt from the
FOIA as trade secret when the NRC determined that the benefits of public appraisal
of agency action outweigh the "demonstrated concern for protection of competitive
position." Id. at 88, 93. The court noted that the regulations had been subject to
extensive public comment. Id. at 86.
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in exercising its discretion to release safety and efficacy data. The
agency should consider whether release of the data will: 1) facilitate
public evaluation of the data; 2) increase public awareness of internal
FDA procedures; and 3) reduce the need for duplicative testing of the
new drug.
Additionally, the FDA must protect the legitimate needs of the
new-drug manufacturer by minimizing the disincentive to future re-
search and development that may result from disclosure. Current
FDA regulations, which state that once information is in the public
domain it may be released to anyone requesting it, l1 7 should be revised
to exclude safety and efficacy data released by the FDA pursuant to
such "discretionary" regulation. The FDA should also explicitly pro-
hibit the use of disclosed safety and efficacy data by drug manufactur-
ers seeking to use such data in support of their own NDA. The FDA
has suggested that a five-year period in which other manufacturers
could not use such data would be adequate to protect the submitting
manufacturer."' 8
CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Citizen Health Research definition of trade secret
by the FDA is appropriate in light of the legislative history of section
3010) of the Act. If this definition is applied, the FDA may, and
should, issue regulations promoting discretionary disclosure of safety
and efficacy data.
Richard S. Fortunato
117. 21 C.F.R. § 20.81(a) (1983).
118. See Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1075 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. 378 (1979) (testimony of Donald Kennedy,
Comm'r, FDA); Final Report, supra note 7, at A-3.
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